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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
JASON LAVET BETHUNE,

Case No. 21‐CV‐2118 (NEB/HB)

Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

FACEBOOK INC. and MARK
ZUCKERBERG,
Defendants.

Plaintiff Jason Lavet Bethune alleges, tersely, that defendants Facebook, Inc.
(“Facebook”) and Mark Zuckerberg shut down a social‐media page created by him, and
he now seeks $222 billion in damages as a result. Bethune did not pay the filing fee for
this matter, instead applying for in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status. See ECF No. 2. That IFP
application is now before the Court and must be considered before any other action may
be taken in this matter.
After review, the Court concludes that Bethune qualifies financially for IFP status.
That said, “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been
paid [by an IFP applicant], the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines” that the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); accord Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1128 (8th
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Cir. 1996) (per curiam). In reviewing whether a complaint states a claim on which relief
may be granted, this Court must accept as true all of the factual allegations in the
complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Aten v. Scottsdale
Ins. Co., 511 F.3d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 2008). Although the factual allegations in the complaint
need not be detailed, they must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the
speculative level . . . .” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint
must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. In assessing the
sufficiency of the complaint, the court may disregard legal conclusions that are couched
as factual allegations. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Pro se complaints are
to be construed liberally, but the pleading must still allege sufficient facts to support the
claims advanced. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).
Bethune seeks relief pursuant to four federal statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 249, 18 U.S.C.
§ 242, 18 U.S.C. § 371, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with the final statute implicitly invoked due
to alleged infringement of Bethune’s constitutional rights under the First Amendment.
See Compl. at 4 [ECF No. 1]. All four claims are non‐starters. The first three statutory
provisions are criminal‐law provisions that do not supply a right of action to private
litigants such as Bethune. See Frison v. Zebro, 339 F.3d 994, 999 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that
“[c]riminal statutes, which express prohibitions rather than personal entitlements and
specify a particular remedy other than civil litigation, are . . . poor candidates for the
imputation of private rights of action. (Quotation omitted)); 18 U.S.C. § 249(b) (specifying
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that the provision relates to “prosecution” of “offense[s]” to be “undertaken by the
United States”); Horde v. Elliot, No. 17‐CV‐0800 (WMW/SER), 2018 WL 987683, at *10 (D.
Minn. Jan. 9, 2018) (collecting cases for “well‐settled” conclusion that “18 U.S.C. § 242
does not provide a private right of action); Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th
Cir. 2007) (noting that § 241 and § 371 do “not provide for a private right of action and
are thus not enforceable through a civil action”); Deuerlein v. Nebraska Child Protective
Services, 793 F. App’x 468, 468 (8th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (citing Andrews in affirming
dismissal of action brought under § 371).
By contrast, § 1983 does supply a private right of action to litigants seeking to
vindicate their constitutional rights. That said, “[o]nly state actors can be held liable
under Section 1983.” Youngblood v. Hy‐Vee Food Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir.
2001). Neither Facebook nor Zuckerberg is alleged, or can plausibly be alleged, to be a
“state actor” within the meaning of § 1983. See Prager University v. Google LLC, 951
F.3d 991, 997 n.3 (9th Cir. 2020) (collecting cases for proposition that private social‐media
companies such as and including Facebook are not state actors for purposes of § 1983).
Bethune cannot seek relief under § 1983 due to actions taken by the defendants named to
this lawsuit.
Accordingly, Bethune has failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted,
and this action will be dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Because the claims raised
by Bethune are not amenable to repleading and any proposed amendment of the
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complaint would be futile, the dismissal will be effected with prejudice. Finally, the
Court certifies that the grounds for dismissal set forth in this order are sufficiently well
established by prior case law that any appeal from this order would be taken in the
absence of good faith. Any request by Bethune to proceed IFP on appeal from the
dismissal of this action would therefore be denied by the Court on that basis. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

This matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

2.

The application to proceed in forma pauperis of plaintiff Jason Lavet Bethune
[ECF No. 2] is DENIED.

3.

The Court certifies that any appeal taken from this action would not be
taken in good faith and that any application to proceed in forma pauperis on
appeal would be denied by the Court on that basis.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: October 15, 2021

BY THE COURT:
s/Nancy E. Brasel
Nancy E. Brasel
United States District Judge
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